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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
Petitioner Terrance Tucker contends in this habeas corpus petition that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel on direct appeal did not raise 
the potential claim that Tucker’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was infringed 
during his state-court trial. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania granted Tucker’s habeas petition, finding the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania had unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, and ordered the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to release Tucker or grant him a new trial. The 




The charges against Tucker stem from the February 20, 2002 homicide of Mikal 
Scott. Scott provided statements to police against two members of a rival gang during a 
prior murder investigation in 2000, but recanted his statement prior to trial. According to 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and does not constitute binding 
precedent. I.O.P. 5.7 
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the Commonwealth’s theory of the case and evidence adduced at trial, in retaliation for 
Scott recanting his statement, Tucker and a co-conspirator shot and killed Scott. 
B. 
The Commonwealth charged Tucker with murder and several other offenses. His 
trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County began on November 12, 2003. 
J.A. 87. After holding an off-the-record discussion with counsel in chambers, the trial 
judge closed the courtroom to the public. The judge said, “I have determined that I am 
going to close the courtroom for the balance of this proceeding. No citizens will be 
permitted to observe this trial until I decide otherwise.” Id. at 182. The judge gave two 
reasons for closing the courtroom—courtroom disruptions and witness tampering and 
intimidation. 
As to the first reason, the judge explained: 
During the beginning instructions I noticed many, many citizens coming 
into the courtroom whose behavior was not cooperative. They were 
attempting to talk to Mr. Tucker. Mr. Tucker was attempting to 
communicate with them at points in time when [defense counsel] was 
focused on the jury, and to such a degree that I had to have a message sent 
to [defense counsel] to have Mr. Tucker stop. 
Id. Earlier that day, the judge had twice admonished Tucker’s father and other people in 
the gallery for disrupting the trial by speaking to Tucker. Id. at 166, 171. Despite these 
admonishments to the gallery, the judge also had to instruct Tucker to “face forward” so 
spectators could not communicate with him. Id. at 182. The judge was concerned not 
only with the uncooperative behavior of Tucker, his father, and other spectators, but also 
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with the “exceedingly complex” relationships among the witnesses scheduled to testify 
on behalf of the Commonwealth and Tucker,1 and how that complexity might affect the 
orderly administration of trial. Id. at 183. Closing the courtroom would prevent disruption 
and keep witness testimony as “pristine as possible . . . so that the jury has a clean record 
with which to work.” Id. As the Superior Court of Pennsylvania later added, “[closure 
was] particularly [appropriate] since this case had its genesis in a gang-related dispute.” 
Id. at 58. 
 As to the second reason for closing the courtroom—witness tampering and 
intimidation—the trial judge explained that “[the court had] previously documented in 
this record that there may have been attempts at witness tampering.” Id. at 182. 
Specifically, an eyewitness to the murder, Tonaysha Austin,2 failed to appear on the first 
scheduled day of trial because, as the Commonwealth’s attorney explained during the 
pretrial colloquy, one of Austin’s relatives who had recently been in jail with Tucker, and 
“who she would not identify . . . because she was scared,” had given her a message from 
Tucker.3 Id. at 168. Tucker allegedly told Austin’s relative to tell her that “if [Austin] 
comes to court that she shouldn’t say he was the one that did it because he wasn’t the one 
                                              
1 For example, Naima Scott—the sister of Mikal Scott—was also the cousin of Damon 
Walls, who was involved in the prior homicide in 2000. See J.A. 297. 
2 Austin had been seated in the car behind Scott when he was shot, and had been with 
Tucker earlier that day. 
3 These incidents of witness tampering impeded the administration of the trial. Because 
Austin failed to appear on the first day of trial, the trial had to be postponed to 
Wednesday of that week. J.A. 167. 
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who did it.” Id. The Commonwealth acknowledged this threat was “oblique,” id., but 
because Austin was “afraid about coming to testify” and “concerned about herself, her 
family, and . . . this relative,” the Commonwealth placed her in a hotel “out of 
Philadelphia” for “her to feel like she [was] going to be safe,” id. at 169. In her testimony 
at Tucker’s trial, Austin expressed she was still “scared” “to be in the room with 
[Tucker].” Id. at 197.4  
Tucker’s attorney objected to the closure. Id. at 183. The trial judge overruled the 
objection, but stated the issue was preserved for review. Id. The jury heard testimony 
from fourteen witnesses over the course of three days. Aside from Austin, who testified 
on the first and second days of trial, the other testifying witnesses were Anne Williams 
(another eyewitness), id. at 259, a medical examiner, id. at 291, two detectives, id. at 236, 
239–240, four police officers, id. at 246, 253, 309–10, 316–17, and Tucker’s prior 
counsel, id. at 304. Scott’s sister also testified, id. at 296, as did three witnesses for 
Tucker during the second half of the third day of witness testimony, id. at 322, 327, 330–
31. 
                                              
4 The Commonwealth also alleged, and evidence supports, that Austin failed to appear at 
the preliminary hearing because she was influenced by a friend of Tucker’s. When asked 
at the preliminary hearing if she was threatened not to come, Austin responded “Amir 
Muhammed told me that if I didn’t come to Court three times that it would be all thrown 
out.” Id. at 308. When pressed on this at Tucker’s trial, Austin testified that prior to the 
preliminary hearing, Muhammed, the brother of Isa Muhammed and a friend of Tucker’s, 
took Austin to see a lawyer. Id. at 196. “Muhammed went into the room to talk to the 
lawyer while [Austin] was sitting outside waiting for him to finish. Then he came back 
out and he told me if I don’t come to court three times that it will be dismissed.” Id. 
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Although the record is unclear, it appears the courtroom was not entirely closed 
during the entirety of witness testimony. On the first day of witness testimony, during the 
first half of Austin’s direct examination, there was a detective in the courtroom who was 
on another case as well as an intern for the Commonwealth. Id. at 185. The intern, who 
we do not consider a member of the public, was allowed to stay, but the detective was 
asked to leave for the remainder of Austin’s direct examination and the first half of her 
cross examination. Id. at 198. At the start of the second day, which continued with 
Austin’s cross examination, the trial judge noted that her friend, a professor from Drexel 
University, and her students were in attendance, taking notes. Id. at 227. It is unclear 
from the record how long they stayed. It is also unclear whether any members of the 
public were present during the third day of witness testimony. 
Once witness testimony had concluded, the trial judge reopened the rest of the 
proceedings to the public.5  Id. at 333. On November 19, 2003, the jury found Tucker 
guilty of third-degree murder, possessing an instrument of crime, reckless endangerment, 
and criminal conspiracy. Id. at 378. He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 
thirty to sixty years. Id. at 519. 
                                              
5 The trial court judge initially only contemplated letting the mothers of the victim and 
defendant in, but explained that she “[didn’t] know who Mr. Tucker’s mother [was] 
because so many people were trying to get into the courtroom” and “[d]ifferent people 
kept claiming that they were [Tucker’s] mom. All kinds of people claimed to be 




Tucker appealed his conviction and sentence to the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania. Tucker, represented on appeal by his trial counsel, raised six challenges,6 
but did not challenge the courtroom closure. Id. at 806–07. Tucker’s conviction and 
sentence were affirmed, id. at 73–84, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied 
review, Commonwealth v. Tucker, 911 A.2d 935 (Pa. 2006) (table). 
Tucker filed a petition for collateral relief under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction 
Relief Act (PCRA) in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. J.A. 768. 
Among various ineffectiveness claims, Tucker claimed his appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge the courtroom closure. Id. at 772. The closure, he 
contended, violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial because it failed to pass 
the standard set by the Supreme Court of the United States in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 
39, 45 (1984). Id. at 772–75. The PCRA court denied Tucker’s petition, explaining the 
trial court’s reasoning for not closing the courtroom as follows: 
This case grew out of a dispute between two rival gangs. It was preceded 
by at least two other murders. The relationship between these groups was 
                                              
6 On direct appeal, Tucker alleged:  
(1) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony to establish a motive; (2) 
the trial court erred in limiting the cross-examination of a prosecution witness; (3) 
the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony; (4) the trial court erred in 
permitting the court reporter to read back portions of testimony; (5) the evidence 
of third-degree murder and conspiracy was insufficient; and (6) the trial court 
failed to consider Tucker’s background during sentencing and failed to adequately 
explain the length of the sentence. 
J.A. 28 (citing Direct Appeal Op. at 4–5). 
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complex and not completely clear. It involved documented violent incidents 
of witness intimidation and retaliation. During opening statements a large 
group of young men entered the courtroom and attempted quite obviously 
to have inappropriate contact with [Tucker], who also attempted to 
communicate with the people in the courtroom. As a result, both counsel 
were advised of the necessity to close the courtroom in order to preserve the 
sanctity of the proceedings. 
 
Id. at 68 (internal citations to the trial record omitted).7 
 
On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the PCRA order, citing 
the above language. Id. at 58. Instead of applying the Waller test, however, it analyzed 
the legality of the closure under a state-law standard, and found the closure permissible. 
Id. at 57–59. Accordingly, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held Tucker’s appellate 
counsel was not ineffective. Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania again denied review. 
Commonwealth v. Tucker, 8 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2010) (table). 
D. 
Tucker reasserted his ineffective assistance claim in a timely habeas petition. See 
28 U.S.C. § 2254; J.A. 569, 646. A Magistrate Judge recommended Tucker’s “petition be 
denied as meritless.” J.A. 26. He found the decision to close the courtroom justified under 
Waller, because “[a]s the trial court found, many spectators attempted to communicate 
with Tucker during opening statements,” and “[t]here had been documented concerns of 
                                              
7 Judge Renee Caldwell Hughes presided over Tucker’s initial trial and the PCRA trial. 
This is common practice in the Pennsylvania courts. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 
210, 229 n.13 (3d Cir. 2004); Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125, 1140 (Pa. 2009) 
(noting in passing “that the PCRA judge . . . [is] oftentimes . . . the same judge who 
presided over the petitioner’s trial”). 
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witness intimidation earlier in the case, and the relationships between Tucker, the 
decedent, and various witnesses were complex.” Id. at 36.  
The District Court disagreed with the Magistrate Judge’s Waller analysis, declined 
to adopt his recommendation, and issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering the 
Commonwealth to either release Tucker or grant him a new trial. Tucker v. Wenerowicz, 
98 F. Supp. 3d 760, 781 (E.D. Pa. 2015). The court reasoned the courtroom closure 
violated the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Waller, see id. 
at 765–66, and held appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal this “plainly-
meritorious claim,” id. at 779. The Commonwealth appealed. J.A. 1. 
II.8 
The Commonwealth contends we must reverse the District Court’s decision 
because the Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s resolution of Tucker’s ineffective 
assistance claim was not contrary to a clearly established holding of the Supreme Court 
of the United States. We disagree. The Superior Court applied a standard contrary to 
established federal law that was less favorable to Tucker in evaluating the underlying 
courtroom closure claim. However, we nonetheless reverse the order of the District Court 
granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus because we conclude, conducting our 
own de novo Strickland review, Tucker has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a 
                                              
8 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s decision to grant Tucker’s habeas petition. Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 
100 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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reasonable probability that the outcome in his case would have been different but for his 
counsel’s failure to raise the closure issue on appeal. 
A. 
Because Tucker’s ineffective assistance claim was adjudicated on the merits by 
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, it is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214 (“AEDPA”). Under AEDPA, habeas relief is 
unavailable unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination 
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d). Tucker does not contend the Superior Court’s decision was factually 
erroneous. Instead, he contends, as framed by the District Court, it involved an 
“unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)”—the 
Supreme Court case addressing ineffective assistance of counsel claims—“vis-à-vis 
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).” Tucker, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 765. 
A decision by a state court is “contrary to . . . clearly established law if it applies a 
rule that contradicts the governing law set forth” in Supreme Court precedent. Price v. 
Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quotations and citations omitted). A state court need 
not have cited any particular Supreme Court decisions, and this standard affords 
considerable latitude to the state court, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of 
the state-court decision contradicts” federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) 
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(per curiam) (emphasis added). In this regard, the state court’s decision need not even be 
accompanied by an explanation, as long as there was a “reasonable basis for the state 
court to deny relief.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).  
However, “when the state court pens a clear, reasoned opinion, federal habeas 
courts may not speculate as to theories that ‘could have supported’ the state court’s 
decision.” Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 834 F.3d 263, 283 (3d Cir. 2016) (en 
banc). If a state court does provide reasoning, the state court decision is not entitled to 
deference if no “fairminded jurist[]” could “disagree that those arguments or theories are 
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of” the Supreme Court. Richter, 562 U.S. 
at 102. The state court may not add or remove a factor from a clearly established federal 
law test. Dennis, 834 F.3d at 307 (concluding that adding an admissibility requirement to 
Fourteenth Amendment Brady inquiry constituted “an unreasonable application of” and 
was “contrary to” clearly established federal law); see also Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 
1040, 1051 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The addition, deletion, or alteration of a factor in a test 
established by the Supreme Court . . . constitutes a failure to apply controlling Supreme 
Court law under the ‘contrary to’ clause of AEDPA.”). 
B. 
The federal claim here is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which requires 
a defendant to establish (1) constitutionally deficient representation, and (2) resulting 
prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim serves 
as the vehicle for the actual error alleged—the Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s analysis 
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of whether there was a violation of Tucker’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial 
under Supreme Court precedent. The Superior Court engaged in a Sixth Amendment 
analysis when determining whether Tucker’s counsel constitutionally erred by not 
appealing the courtroom closure, and concluded that because there was no viable Sixth 
Amendment claim to appeal, Tucker’s appellate counsel could not have been deficient in 
choosing not to appeal it.  
Under Supreme Court precedent, closing a courtroom is permissible only if the 
following requirements are met: (1) there is “an overriding interest that is likely to be 
prejudiced,” (2) the closure is “no broader than necessary to protect that interest,” (3) the 
trial court considers “reasonable alternatives” to closure, and (4) the trial court makes 
“findings adequate to support the closure.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.9  
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania did not apply Waller, but instead applied a 
less rigorous standard from Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1985). Under 
this standard, “[w]here trial courts perceive a threat to the orderly administration of 
                                              
9 On appeal, the Commonwealth contends for the first time that Waller does not apply 
because the closure was “partial” rather than “complete.” See Appellant’s Br. 44–45. 
Whether a closure is complete or partial “depends not on how long a trial is closed, but 
rather who is excluded during the period of time in question.” United States v. Thompson, 
713 F.3d 388, 395 (8th Cir. 2013). While not without doubt, the facts of Thompson are 
sufficiently distinguishable that we do not address the standard articulated in that case for 
reviewing partial closures. Thompson involved a closure limited only to defendant’s 
relatives and only for a single witness’s testimony. Id. In Tucker’s case, the trial judge 
chose to close the courtroom during the testimony of all witnesses, including the six law 
enforcement officers who testified, and to all members of the public, save for a detective 




justice in their courtrooms by an unmanageable public, they may always place reasonable 
restrictions on access to the courtroom, so long as the basic guarantees of fairness are 
preserved . . . .” Berrigan, 501 A.2d at 234. The Superior Court explained it “is the 
responsibility of the court to maintain not only the control but also the security of the 
courtroom,” J.A. 672 (citing Commonwealth v. Pantano, 836 A.2d 948 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2003)), and that the right to a public trial “serves two purposes: (1) it prevents the 
accused from being subject to a Star Chamber proceeding; and (2) assures the public that 
the standards of fairness are being observed.” Id. at 682 (citing Commonwealth v. 
Constant, 925 A.2d 810, 817 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)). 
The standard applied by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania is contrary to Waller. 
Specifically, the Superior Court failed to consider the second, third, and fourth prongs of 
the Waller test. The Superior Court identified an overriding interest that would be 
prejudiced, specifically “disruption caused by the spectators in the courtroom, 
particularly since this case had its genesis in a gang-related dispute.” Id. at 683. However, 
having identified this interest, the Superior Court concluded its analysis, because “by no 
means did the trial resemble a proceeding in the Star Chamber and we have a record of 
the proceedings to review on appeal.” Id. at 683. 
The standard articulated in Berrigan that allows “reasonable restrictions” on 
public access to the courtroom is inconsistent with the narrow tailoring required by 
Waller. The Superior Court did not consider whether the closure was narrowly tailored, 
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whether reasonable alternatives to a complete closure existed,10 and did not evaluate 
whether the trial court’s findings on the record justified the scope of the closure. See 
Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. Moreover, the interests identified by the Superior Court and relied 
on for its conclusion—preventing “Star Chamber” proceedings and preserving a record 
for review—are dramatically narrower than the interests that must be considered under 
controlling federal law. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 47 (identifying “strong interest” of the 
“public in general” in exposing court proceedings to “the salutary effects of public 
scrutiny”). Because both prongs of the Superior Court’s Strickland analysis necessarily 
depended on the analysis of the underlying Waller claim, the Superior Court’s Strickland 
analysis is an unreasonable application of and contrary to clearly established federal law.  
We are deeply concerned that Pennsylvania courts, including the Superior Court in 
Tucker’s case, are not applying Waller when analyzing defendants’ Sixth Amendment 
public-trial claims. In the first few years after Waller, two Pennsylvania courts of appeal 
concluded the closures in those cases violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
a public trial because the trial courts had failed to make specific findings in support of the 
closure as required under Waller. See Commonwealth v. Penn, 562 A.2d 833, 836–39 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Commonwealth v. Murray, 502 A.2d 624, 627–29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1985). But more recent Pennsylvania decisions, even those with thorough discussions on 
                                              
10 As discussed infra, the trial court may not have had a clearly established duty to 




closure, have reverted to Pennsylvania’s less rigorous Berrigan standard. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Tirado, No. 3088 EDA 2010, 2013 WL 11259149, at *2 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. July 12, 2013) (applying Berrigan in a Sixth Amendment public-trial challenge); 
Commonwealth v. Constant, 925 A.2d 810, 817 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (same); 
Commonwealth v. Conde, 822 A.2d 45, 50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (same). So too here. 
Although Tucker cited and argued Waller in both his PCRA petition and in his appellate 
brief, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ignored the Waller standard and applied the less 
rigorous Pennsylvania standard. J.A. 58 (concluding the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it closed the courtroom because the trial court was “acutely—and 
justifiably—concerned about the disruption caused by the spectators in the courtroom”). 
Because the Superior Court’s Strickland analysis turned on an analysis of the right 
to a public trial that is inconsistent with Waller, § 2254(d)(1) is satisfied and the decision 
of the Superior Court is not entitled to AEDPA deference. 
C. 
Having determined that the state court decision is not entitled to deference under 
AEDPA, we proceed to a de novo evaluation of the constitutional claim on the merits. 
Panetti v Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (“When . . . the requirement set forth in 
§ 2254(d)(1) is satisfied[,] [a] federal court must then resolve the claim without the 
deference AEDPA otherwise requires.”). As explained previously, Tucker raises a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland and thus must establish (1) 
constitutionally deficient representation, and (2) resulting prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. 
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at 687. We may consider the Strickland prongs in either order, and we have observed that 
“it is often practical to consider the prejudice prong first.” United States v. Fazio, 795 
F.3d 421, 426 (3d Cir. 2015). To demonstrate prejudice, petitioner must show “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
In this case, to establish prejudice, Tucker must establish that but for his counsel’s 
failure to raise the courtroom closure claim on direct appeal, the outcome of his appeal 
would have been different. Thus, Tucker must demonstrate that the underlying Waller 
claim would have had a reasonable probability of success—“sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The “mere possibility” that the 
outcome would have been different is not sufficient to establish Strickland prejudice. 
Rountree v. Balicki, 640 F.3d 530, 538 (3d Cir. 2011). Tucker has not met this burden. 
Under the first prong of Waller, the interests cited by the trial judge—maintaining 
order and preventing witness intimidation and tampering—were overriding. See 
Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 514 (1974) (“[C]ases in this Court have 
consistently . . . . [recognized] the need to maintain order and a deliberative atmosphere 
in the courtroom.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 559, 562 (1965) (“[I]t is of the utmost importance that the administration of justice 
be absolutely fair and orderly. This Court has recognized that the unhindered and 
untrammeled functioning of our courts is part of the very foundation of our constitutional 
democracy.”). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), (d) (federal witness-tampering statute); 
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18 Pa. Stat. & Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4952 (West 2002) (state witness-tampering statute). 
These interests were likely to be prejudiced in the absence of closure because audience 
members had already disrupted the trial on multiple occasions. More significantly, 
Tucker’s trial was part of a dispute between two rival gangs that had previously resorted 
to witness intimidation, and Austin feared testifying after Tucker purportedly threatened 
her. See Tucker, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 776.  
On the second prong, the scope of the closure was not overbroad based on 
adequate findings of fact—as required under the fourth prong of Waller. With respect to 
witness tampering and intimidation, on each day the courtroom was closed, witnesses 
testified who either had already been tampered with or intimidated, or for whom there 
was a strong likelihood of tampering or intimidation. Austin testified on days one and 
two, Anne Williams (another eyewitness who lived in the neighborhood) on day two, and 
Naima Scott (the sister of the victim) as well as Tucker’s witnesses testified on day three. 
These witnesses had connections to rival gangs and to one another. The trial judge 
observed on the record that it was impossible to tell who was who in the gallery, 
particularly because some observers when asked provided obviously false identities. J.A. 
333 (“[A]ll these different women kept coming up saying I am his mother . . . .”). In view 
of these findings by the trial court, even if it is possible that an appellate court could hold 
that a more specific parsing of the closure throughout the day would have been feasible, 
we cannot say that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the appeal 
would be different. On the contrary, a reviewing court would likely conclude—given the 
18 
 
gang related origins of the case, the number of people involved in the underlying 
incidents and resulting witness intimidation, the frequent and unexpected disruptions, and 
the repeated disregard of the trial court's many admonishments to Tucker and the 
gallery—that the trial court's decision to close the courtroom for the entirety of the 
witness testimony was not overly broad and was necessary to stymie further witness 
intimidation and to maintain control of the courtroom.  
With respect to the third prong, at the time of Tucker’s trial, there was some 
uncertainty whether this step of the Waller test compelled courts to consider reasonable 
alternatives sua sponte, or whether the party opposing closure had to propose them.11 In 
2010, several years after Tucker’s trial, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved 
this possible uncertainty, holding that “trial courts are required to consider alternatives to 
closure even when they are not offered by the parties . . . .” Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 
209, 214 (2010).  
The trial court no doubt could have been more explicit in considering alternatives 
to closure on the record. But implicit in the trial court's findings and the observations she 
made on the record was her consideration and rejection of a number of alternatives, 
including addressing disruptions as they arose, J.A. 182 (trial judge explaining that her 
                                              
11 See, e.g., Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 71 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (declining to 
consider “[w]hether or not a sua sponte obligation exists [under Waller] to consider 
alternatives to complete closure”); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 169 (4th Cir. 2000) (en 
banc) (concluding sua sponte consideration was unnecessary in the context of partial 
closure involving a child abuse victim). 
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repeated admonishments to the gallery and Tucker had been unsuccessful as they 
continued “attempting to communicate” with each other to the point that she needed to 
send defense counsel “a message . . . to have Mr. Tucker stop”), barring particular 
persons who were disruptive from the courtroom, id. at 182-83 (trial court stating that 
during the opening instructions “many, many citizens [came] into the courtroom whose 
behavior was not cooperative” and indicating exclusion of only those persons was not 
feasible due to the “exceedingly complex” relationships among the parties who are 
related both “by blood, [and] by marriage” and who “live in the same neighborhood 
together”), and allowing certain non-disruptive persons back into the courtroom, id. at 
333 (trial court noting it was amenable to allowing Tucker's and victim's mothers back 
into courtroom but was unable to distinguish among the many women who represented 
themselves as Tucker's mother). In addition, the trial court's decision to close the 
courtroom was preceded by an off-the-record discussion with counsel. Id. at 182. It is 
apparent under these circumstances that the trial judge did consider alternatives, and, 
particularly given the incidents of witness tampering and complicated relationships 
between the people in the courtroom and the fact that Tucker was charged with the 
murder of a witness to a prior homicide in an ongoing gang dispute, id. at 241-42, she 
reasonably concluded that none would have alleviated the concerns of witness tampering 
and courtroom control. See Presley, 558 U.S. at 209 (“Trial courts are obligated to take 
every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials.”). 
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The fourth prong of Waller is satisfied as well. Under the fourth prong, “the 
particular interest, and threat to that interest, must ‘be articulated along with findings 
specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was 
properly entered.’” Presley, 558 U.S. at 215 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. 
of Cal., Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). As outlined above, the trial judge 
articulated the overriding interests on the record and explained why she decided that a 
closed trial was the best way to protect those interests. J.A. 182–83. While the trial judge 
could have been more explicit as to why she rejected alternatives short of a complete 
closure, the findings are sufficient to determine whether the closure order was properly 
entered. 
We conclude that Tucker has failed to meet his burden of showing that but for the 
failure of his appellate counsel to raise the Waller claim there is a reasonable probability 
the outcome of his appeal would have been different. For this reason, we will reverse the 
District Court’s order granting Tucker’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remand 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
